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1 Introduction
This is a theoretical paper discussing the consequences of horizontal mergers on two-sided mar-
kets. We conduct an equilibrium analysis in a four-platform framework allowing for horizontal
diﬀerentiation: we determine post-merger outcomes (prices, proﬁts and welfare levels) taking
into account the cost savings from the merger as well as the pricing behavior of outsider plat-
forms. We ﬁnd that the impact of merger cost savings on prices is generally not monotonic, and
that it takes high enough cost savings for horizontal platform mergers to be Pareto-improving.
In addition, for a given level of synergies, the merger may beneﬁt users on one side while harming
users on the opposite side. This raises interesting questions for competition authorities when
assessing mergers between rival platforms on two-sided markets.
Starting with Rochet and Tirole (2002, 2003), two-sided markets have been the object of
increasing research focus. These industries often exhibit business strategies and outcomes that
would be sub-optimal on traditional/one-sided markets. For instance, setting prices below cost
on one side can be proﬁt-maximizing thanks to the resulting increase in demand on the opposite
side through the indirect (or cross-group) network eﬀects. Furthermore, from a normative point
of view, this outcome should not be subject to antitrust vetoing, as predatory pricing would
be. And while much has been accomplished regarding unilateral pricing strategies on two-sided
markets1, much is left to be done for the study of coordinated behavior, in particular pricing
following horizontal mergers.
Mergers between rivals typically give rise to enhanced market power and higher prices, thus
harming customers. But on two-sided markets another eﬀect may reverse this outcome: the
cross-group externalities granting users increased utility from having access to a greater pool of
business partners on the other side of the platform may neutralize, and even outweigh the utility
loss due to a price increase. As a result, the merger could actually be welfare enhancing rather
than welfare detrimental (Evans, 2003). Moreover, it is even possible for post-merger prices to
1See OCDE 2018, Part IV, for a recent review.
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be lower than before merger, due to the fact that the merging platforms internalize the eﬀect
of a price increase on the partner platform. In other words, the same indirect externality may
reverse the typical post-merger incentive to increase prices to exploit market power (Chandra
and Collard-Wexler, 2009, and Leonello, 2010). It is now quite generally acknowledged that
insights from traditional merger analysis do not directly apply to platform markets (see e.g.
Wright, 2004, Evans and Noel, 2008, Evans and Schmalensee, 2013 or Aﬀeldt et al., 2013).
Understanding and correctly predicting the outcome of mergers on two-sided markets is
increasingly relevant from the public policy viewpoint (Economides 2008, 2010). Interestingly
enough, various agencies have addressed this challenge in diﬀerent ways, and the two-sided
nature of the market does not systematically play a role in the decision.2 For the 2004 UK
merger between two weekly local newspapers, Archant and Independent News and Media3, the
Competition Commission looked into the impact on advertisers but ignored that on readers.
Doing the same, i.e., focusing on the advertising side of the market, allowed the DoJ and the
FCC to clear in 2008 the merger between the only two US satellite digital radio services, which
would have been considered a 2-to-1 merger, unless the relevant market had been widened to
include, on the advertising side, other kinds of broadcast.4 In Norway, the media merger between
Edda Media and A-Pressen5, the second and the third largest media houses in the country, was
cleared in 2012 conditional on structural remedies/asset divestitures of local newspapers on two
overlapping local/geographic markets, after the two sides of the market, readers and advertisers,
had been considered independently, but with a discussion of the network externality from readers
to advertisers. The European Commission cleared in 2007 the merger between Travelport and
Worldspan thanks to the lack of negative eﬀect on travel agents because the platforms were
arguably likely to build a large enough network to attract agents on the other side (travel service
2 Incidentally, although a new edition of the US Merger Guidelines was released in 2010, replacing the previous
Guidelines from 1992, there was still no mention of platform markets.
3UK Competition Commission, “A report on the acquisition by Archant Limited of the London Newspapers
of Independent News and Media Limited,”2004.
4Belleﬂamme and Peitz, 2015.
5Konkurranse Tilsynet Case 2011/0925 MAB BMBE.
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providers).6 Later on, the European Commission prohibited the 2012 stock exchanges merger
between Deutsche Börse and NYSE Euronext due to insuﬃcient cost savings to compensate for
the supposedly likely post-merger price increase.7
Despite the surge in platform merger cases for competition authorities, the latter still lack
clear guidance on how to assess them, because the literature on this topic is still relatively scarce.8
Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) study post-merger pricing in a modiﬁed Hotelling duopoly of
newspaper platforms with single-homing readers and multi-homing advertisers. The key ﬁnding
is that a monopolist platform may not necessarily lead to higher prices on either side as long
as readers are heterogeneous with respect to the value they bring to advertisers, and the less-
valuable readers are also those who are more price-sensitive. This result is however conditioned
on pricing below marginal cost on the reader side: if newspapers sell their content at a price
below marginal cost, then additional readers are only valuable to the extent that the revenues
which could be made by selling their attention to advertisers are greater than the subsidy.9 In
a model of diﬀerentiated products à la Salop (1979) on both sides of the market, where the
side consuming content does not pay, Malam (2011) ﬁnds that a merger to monopoly between
ad-sponsored platforms lacks the incentive to increase prices on the advertiser side. Leonello
(2010) considers the alternative setting of two newspapers located at the extreme points of a
Hotelling line. In a merger-to-monopoly scenario, the monopolist will oﬀer advertisers in one
6Case No. M.4523.
7Case No. M.6166.
8The empirical evidence available focuses on media markets, and provides somewhat mixed results. Chandra
and Collard-Wexler (2009) assess mergers in the Canadian newspaper market to conclude that greater concen-
tration did not lead to higher prices for either readers or advertisers. Filistrucchi et al. (2012) test the unilateral
eﬀect of a hypothetical merger in the Dutch newspaper industry to ﬁnd only a small eﬀect on subscription prices
and readers’ welfare, but a substantial increase in the price paid per reader by advertisers. Jeziorski (2014) uses
data from the 1996-2006 US radio industry merger wave to estimates a structural supply-and-demand model and
ﬁnds on a a 11% drop in advertisement volumes and a 6% increase in per viwer ad prices. Fan (2013) uses a
structural model of the US daily newspaper market to simulates a merger in the Minneapolis market and con-
cludes that newspaper prices increase and circulation decreases, thus leading to welfare losses for both readers
and advertisers.
9The fact that the data on the Canadian newspaper industry corroborates the absence of price increase post-
merger does not however rule out alternative explanations some mergers may have been driven by motives other
than increased market power, such as for instance empire-building or political motives (Anderson and McLaren,
2012).
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newspaper the opportunity to advertise also in the other one: for a single price, the advertiser
can now reach twice as many consumers as before, which is referred to as "interoperability".
Leonello (2010) shows that the introduction of such advertising bundling by the monopolist
increases the incentives to keep prices low on at least one side of the market, because the
interoperability increases the margin which the newspaper can charge on advertising, and it
thereby becomes proﬁtable to reduce prices on the consumer side in order to stimulate demand.
Overall, welfare could increase following a merger, and this result is obtained absent eﬃciency
gains.10 Unlike these contributions which suggest some policy implications based on merger-
to-monopoly analyses, Tan and Zhou (2019) examines the impact of platform competition on
equilibrium prices and customer participation rates in a general model of price competition
among n multi-sided platforms providing diﬀerentiated services to single-homing users. Their
model incorporates possibly non-linear externalities, as well as random utility maximization by
customers on each side of the market, which makes all platforms equidistant to each other. Tan
and Zhou (2019) concludes that a horizontal merger always has incentives to raise prices in the
absence of cost-related eﬃciency gains. Finally, and in stark contrast to all these contributions,
Correia-da-Silva et al. (2018) devise a model of Cournot competition among two-sided platforms
oﬀering a homogenous service, in order to examine the eﬀects of mergers which do not aﬀect the
average marginal costs of the industry. The paper identiﬁes suﬃcient conditions for such mergers
to beneﬁt users on either side of the market, namely the fact that the externality-adjusted pre-
merger price be below the average marginal cost on the corresponding side. Moreover, when the
externality-adjusted prices on both sides exceed the average marginal cost, the market power
eﬀect of mergers is shown to dominate the potential eﬃciency gains stemming from a larger
participation on each platform.
We, in contrast, focus on the role played by the merger cost savings for the post-merger pric-
ing strategy of all platforms on the market, both insiders and outsiders, and thereby ultimately
10See also Weyl (2010) for the possibility for horizontal mergers to increase market power and thereby lower
participation and welfare on both sides in Armstrong’s (2006) framework. His model considers, again, a duopoly
setting, i.e. merger to monopoly, and without any cost savings.
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for the merger’s impact on users, proﬁts and welfare. This is arguably relevant for competi-
tion authorities that need to explicitly balance the eﬃciency gains from a merger against its
anti-competitive eﬀect in order to decide whether to ban or to clear it11. Our model displays
four symmetrically diﬀerentiated platforms located equidistantly on the unit circle market and
competing in membership fees. Users on both sides single-home, and we allow for both positive
and negative cross-group externalities. The merger involves the complete and costless inter-
operability between the merging platforms, leading to the situation where "buying" from one
merged platform grants access to users of the merging partner. We compute and compare opti-
mal post-merger prices set by both insider and outsider platforms in two diﬀerent cases: bilateral
merger between adjacent, closely substitutable platforms, or between distant, less substitutable
ones. We also assess the mergers’ impact on all platforms’ proﬁts, as well as on users’ consumer
surplus and total welfare.
Starting with the post-merger pricing, we ﬁnd that the adjacent merger will only lead to
lower prices iﬀ it generates enough cost savings. This holds for both sides of the market, and
does not hinge on the sign of the cross-group externality. In contrast, cost savings may not
be necessary for the distant merger to achieve this outcome: post-merger prices always drop
on the side that values relatively less the opposite side, i.e., regardless of the merger synergies,
but this does not hold on the other side. There, insider or outsider platforms may only drop
the price post-merger if the merger generates enough cost savings, depending on the valuation
this side gets from the ﬁrst one (positive or negative). Note thus that as far as the pricing
behavior is concerned, our results conﬁrm the intuition that when merging platforms become
“interoperable”, then each of the merging platforms will have incentives to lower prices to beneﬁt
from the increase in demand on the other platform. But the market power eﬀect of the adjacent
merger goes against this eﬀect, so it takes enough synergies to achieve a price drop. The result
we obtain for the distant merger highlights in turn the substitutability between cost savings
11See for instance the 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the European Commission Merger Regulation
139/2004.
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and indirect network eﬀects: the former are not necessary for prices to drop on one side of the
market, the one that is valued relatively more.12 On the other side, it all depends on the sign
of the indirect externality, because the latter is crucial for the opportunity cost that platforms
face when contemplating a drop in their price to serve additional demand. A further result on
the optimal post-merger pricing holds for both types of merger: on the side that values less
the presence of the other side, all prices drop for lower levels of merger synergies than on the
side exhibiting a higher relative valuation for the opposite side. It is quite straightforward that
platforms have incentives to lower their prices "ﬁrst", i.e., for a lower amount of cost savings,
on the side that will give them the highest return in terms of additional cross-sides demand.
Our analysis also provides some insights for the merger proﬁtability: we actually extend in
this respect the results obtained in the standard, one-sided framework, i.e., the fact that merging
is always proﬁtable for neighboring ﬁrms/platforms, but for distant ﬁrms/platforms only if there
are enough cost savings.13 The intuition relies again on the presence (or lack) of a market power
eﬀect, which is the crucial diﬀerence between the two types of merger considered.
Regarding the welfare impact of the mergers, we ﬁnd that the distant merger always improves
consumers’ surplus, i.e., on both sides and regardless of the amount of merger cost savings. On
the contrary, the adjacent merger only beneﬁts users on either side for high enough eﬃciency
gains. The additional, and even more important conclusion, is that for a given amount of cost
savings from the merger between neighboring platforms, users’ surplus on one side increases,
while that of users on the opposite side decreases.14 This result is driven by the diﬀerent relative
valuation between sides, and is obtained with the underlying assumption of positive margins on
12Recall that in contrast, on the circular one-sided market a merger between distant ﬁrms does not aﬀect prices
if post-merger costs stay the same (Levy and Reitzes, 1992, Brito, 2003, 2005).
13Correia-da-Silva et al. (2018) provides, to our knowledge, the only other proﬁtability analysis for horizontal
mergers between platforms: in their Cournot setting with linear demand, platform mergers are proﬁtable, in the
absence of cost savings, as long as there are no more than four platforms, marginal costs are not too high, and
the network eﬀects are large enough.
14This is a conﬁrmation, by means of an equilibrium analysis, i.e. taking into account the optimal reply of
outsider platforms, of a similar conclusion but in terms of mere incentives to raise price post-merger, obtained
by Cosnita-Langlais and al. (2018). They show that an upward pricing pressure on one side of the market may
result in downward price pressure on the other side.
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both sides of the market.15 Moreover, it is relevant for the practice of competition agencies
enforcing merger control, that may, as a consequence, need to balance one side’s gain against
the other side’s loss. This is far from being the current practice for competition authorities, but
the issue is all the more worth addressing given recent court decisions16 questioning whether
eﬀects on one or both sides of the market should be relevant for the ﬁnal decision. Finally, we
show that both types of platform merger, adjacent and distant, are Pareto-improving only for
high enough cost savings.
Before going on to our model, let us note that we perform a signiﬁcantly more general analysis
than what has been previously done in the literature. To start with, we allow for outsiders
and no longer consider merger to monopoly. We thus provide an equilibrium analysis, since
generally speaking, a merger’s ﬁnal impact on prices, proﬁts and welfare hinges on the outsiders’
conduct. Thirdly, we consider diﬀerent types of merger: between neighbor, or, on the contrary,
distant platforms. Finally, despite the limitations imposed by some speciﬁc assumptions such
as localized competition among platforms and two-sided single-homing, the scope of our results
is wider than it may seem at ﬁrst, because we investigate a somewhat "worst case scenario" for
users/consumers. On the one hand, the localized competition involves captive users for adjacent
platforms, thus enabling clear and strong incentives for a price increase after merger. And on the
other hand, assuming single-homing on both sides guarantees stronger price competition among
platforms than with multi-homing users, and hence also the largest reduction in competition
and strongest increase in market power through the merger.17
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: ﬁrst we introduce the framework, then present
the pre-merger equilibrium. We go on to determine optimal post-merger prices, proﬁts and
welfare, and compare them with the pre-merger levels. We conclude by discussing the policy
15Note that this is actually diﬀerent from the seemingly similar result obtained by Correia-da-Silva et al.
(2018), since their merger preserves the average marginal cost in the industry, and it takes an externality-adjusted
pre-merger price below the marginal cost for prices to fall after the merger.
16See in particular Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) and the Mastercard decision by the
European Court of Justice, C-382/12 P (previously Case T-111/08 EC).
17Recall that since multi-homing consumers choose how many platforms to join, the value of a platform for a
multi-homing users is reduced to its incremental value, so a direct price comparison may not be relevant for her.
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relevance of our results and listing the robustness checks that could be performed. The proofs
for our results, obtained with Maple, are provided in a separate Technical Appendix available
upon request.
2 Framework
We study bilateral mergers between platforms where customers on both sides can join at most
one platform (i.e., two-sided single-homing)18. We consider a four-platform market and adapt the
Hotelling-based framework developed by Armstrong (2006) to have the platforms compete on the
Salop (1979) unit circle. Each platform faces two groups of customers, located on the opposite
sides of the platform, enabling them to interact. The platforms, denoted k ∈ {A,B,C,D},
compete in access or membership fees19: they simultaneously set an access price for each group,
and upon observing these prices, agents choose which unique platform to visit. We assume
equidistant exogenous locations: A is located in 0(1), B in 14 , C in
1
2 and D in
3
4 . The four
platforms compete to attract buyers on both sides bearing the same constant unit production
cost c.
On each side i ∈ {1, 2} there is a unit mass of customers uniformly distributed. Denote v
the reservation price, the same for all buyers. They all have inelastic demand, buying only one
unit of the good/service if the total price is lower than the reservation price. Each customer will
choose the platform oﬀering the lowest total price, equal to the sum of the transportation cost
and the membership fee. We assume linear and symmetric transportation costs on each side: we
normalize to 1 the constant unit transportation cost, and denote d the distance from a platform
to the customer’s location. Thus, the net utility for a customer on side i joining platform k is
18See Belleﬂamme and Peitz (2015) for a reminder that single-homing environments are representative of many
real-life situations.
19We focus on these so as to capture the competition for users/customers rather than the impact on the volume
of transactions of the platforms’ pricing decisions. Note that membership fees are the natural assumption to make
when platforms cannot monitor transactions, so implicitly we focus on such platforms for our analysis. As an
alternative, platforms may charge transaction fees (see Rochet and Tirole, 2003). For an insightful discussion of
the use of diﬀerent price instruments, see Rochet and Tirole (2006).
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equal to:
Uki = v + aix
k
j − pki − di,k (1)
where pki is the price set by platform k on side i, ai the indirect network externality (a customer
patronizing platform k on side j induces consumer utility equal to ai on side i), x
k
j the total
demand reached by platform k on side j, and di,k the distance between the customer and the
platform k. Let ai ≥ 0, and assume the intrinsic utility v to be high enough to always guarantee
full market coverage.
We allow for a single source of exogenous asymmetry between the two sides: let a1 = a
but a2 = β × a, where β ∈ [−1, 1]. Parameter β measures the asymmetry between sides in
term of valuation of the other side’s presence. For instance, with β = 0, side 2 does not value
the presence of side 1, although the latter does value the presence of side 2. On the contrary,
for β = 1, the cross-group externalities are identical for the two sides of the market, meaning
that users on each side of the market value the other side’s participation with the same positive
intensity. Finally, for β = −1, users on side 2 dislike the presence of users on side 1 as intensely
as users on side 1 like side 2.
Before presenting the pre-merger equilibrium, let us note that several features of our frame-
work ﬁt well the case of newspapers as two-sided markets. Horizontal diﬀerentiation is common
among newspapers, and single-homing appears to be a reasonable assumption.20 Furthermore,
there is no agreement in the literature on the tastes of readers regarding advertising21, and we
do account for this by allowing for both positive and negative cross-group externalities.
20Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) ﬁnd that "On each day of the week, more than 84% of advertisers put an
advertising message in only one of the four newspapers, and only 10% in two of them." Kaiser and Wright (2006)
also found that in the German magazine market, from 1972 to 2003, only 8% of the readers and 17% of the
advertisers multihome.
21Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007), van Cayselee and Vanormelingen (2018) and Fan (2013) ﬁnd no eﬀect of
advertising on the sales of daily newspapers in Italy, Belgium and the US respectively. Kaiser and Song (2009)
report that readers of magazines do not dislike advertising, and may even like it depending on the type of magazine.
It seems that ads are mainly disliked when they cannot be avoided, as it is typically the case for TV and radio -
see for instance Wilbur (2008).
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3 Pre-merger analysis
Each platform k will maximize the total proﬁt it makes on both sides of the market by optimally
setting prices pki . In order to establish the pre-merger price equilibrium, the demand system must
be determined ﬁrst, and for this it is necessary to consider the demand served by platform k on
each side. We proceed as follows.
Since platforms are located on a circle, each platform k has two neighbors: kl, on its left,
and kr, on its right. Then, the marginal customer x
k,kl
i between platform k and its neighbor kl
on side i is deﬁned by
v + aix
k
j − pki − xk,kli = v + aixklj − pkli −

1
4
− xk,kli

, (2)
while the marginal customer between k and kr on the same side of the market is deﬁned by:
v + aix
k
j − pki − xk,kri = v + aixkrj − pkri −

1
4
− xk,kri

. (3)
The total demand for platform k on side i is therefore given by xk,kli + x
k,kr
i , where
x
k,kl,r
i =
4aixkj − 4pki − 4aixkl,rj + 4p
kl,r
i + 1
16
, with kl,r = kl, kr. (4)
Solving the system of total demands yields the individual demand xki for each platform k and for
each side i of the market as functions of all prices (see the Technical Appendix for the detailed
derivation).
To ensure that the demand system yields a unique interior solution, some restrictions on our
parameters are required22. More precisely, it is necessary to make sure that participation on
each side is a decreasing function of the access fee on the same side.23 We henceforth assume
22See Armstrong (2006, eq.8) for instance. See Filistrucchi and Klein (2013) for a more general discussion of
such conditions in the case of an oligopoly platform market.
23Given the demand system displayed in the Technical Appendix, and since β ∈ [−1, 1] , this comes down to
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that the following condition holds.
Assumption: let a < 0.5. This is the standard assumption stating that, given our normal-
ization of the transport cost parameter, the intensity of the cross-group network eﬀects is lower
than the strength of the horizontal diﬀerentiation between platforms.
Given the individual demands for each platform, we can now write down the total proﬁt
(from both sides) made by platform k:
Πk = (pki − c)xki + (pkj − c)xkj . (5)
Each platform k maximizes its individual proﬁt by simultaneously setting its prices pki and p
k
j .
Hence, the vector of equilibrium prices

pki
∗
, (pkj )
∗

k=A,B,C,D
solves the system of the FOCs,
i.e., 
pki
∗
= argmax
pki

xki (p
k
i − c) + xkj (pkj − c)

, i, j = 1, 2, k = A,B,C,D. (6)
In the Technical Appendix we derive the SOCs24, which are all satisﬁed for a < 0.5.
Due to symmetry we obtain that before merger the four platforms set the same price on each
side:
pA1 = p
B
1 = p
C
1 = p
D
1 = c+
2− 3aβ − 5a2β + 6a3β2
2 (4− 9a2β) , (7)
pA2 = p
B
2 = p
C
2 = p
D
2 = c+
2− 3a− 5a2β + 6a3β
2 (4− 9a2β) , (8)
whereas all individual (consolidated across sides) pre-merger proﬁts equal
Π =
1
8
6a3β2 + 6a3β − 10a2β − 3aβ − 3a+ 4
4− 9a2β . (9)
Lemma 1 Pre-merger price on side 2 is decreasing in the intensity of the cross-group external-
1
2
5βa2−2
1−5βa2+4β2a4
< 0, or a2β < 0.25.
24See Appendix A1 at the end of the paper.
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ity. Pre-merger price on side 1 is decreasing in the intensity of the cross-group externality if both
sides value the presence of the other side, but increasing with it if one side dislikes the other.
Stand-alone pre-merger proﬁt decreases with the level of cross-group externality unless one side
dislikes the other very much.
Proof. It is straightforward to check that
∂pi
1
∂a
< (>) 0 for β > (<) 0, that
∂pi
2
∂a
< 0 ∀β, and
that ∂Π
∂a
< 0 for β > 0, but ∂Π
∂a
≶ 0 for β < 0, in particular ∂Π
∂a
> 0 only when β → −1 and
a→ 0.5.
Lemma 1 states ﬁrst that prices on both sides are decreasing in the level of cross-group
externality when both sides value the presence of the other side. The intuition is of course
that a stronger cross-group externality provides incentives to lower the price and attract more
customers on both sides of the market: dropping the price on one side increases demand on the
other side, which provides incentives to lower the price on this same side to further increase
demand. But this gives further incentives to drop the price on the ﬁrst side through the cross-
side eﬀect. Note also that even when side 2 dislikes side 1, the price on side 2 is still decreasing
in the level of the cross-group externality, simply because dropping the price on side 2 still
increases demand on side 1. However, the price on side 1 is now increasing with the externality:
the negative valuation that users on side 2 have for side 1 writes oﬀ the opportunity cost of
increasing the price on side 1 in order to capture more of the side 1 users’ utility.
Lemma 1 also makes clear the impact of the cross-group network eﬀect on pre-merger proﬁts:
the standalone proﬁt decreases with the cross-group externality for positive or weakly negative
valuation between sides (which is perfectly intuitive given the overall drop in prices), but in-
creases with it otherwise. More precisely, individual proﬁt only increases with the level of indirect
externality when side 2 strongly dislikes side 1 and the cross-group network eﬀect itself is very
strong. In such a case, the corresponding increase in the price on side 1 more than compensates
the drop in price on side 2 in terms of resulting proﬁt.
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The question we tackle next is the impact of a horizontal merger. Market concentration
typically yields market power for merging ﬁrms, which seize the opportunity to increase proﬁts
by extracting higher prices from their combined residual captive demand. Outsider ﬁrms beneﬁt
from a price-increasing merger, since they also increase their prices, leaving customers clearly
worse oﬀ. However, mergers may also generate cost savings, which may mitigate all this. Merger
cost savings increase the insiders’ eﬃciency relative to their rivals, enabling the insiders to lower
their prices, attract more customers, and thereby increase their proﬁts. The net price eﬀect for
the insider ﬁrms depends on the amount of cost savings, and the outsiders’ own prices will take
into account the insiders’ pricing strategy.
Below we characterize the post-merger market equilibrium and compare it to the pre-merger
situation, so as to study the role played by the cross-group externality for this market-power v.
cost savings trade-oﬀ.
4 Merger analysis
4.1 Preliminary remarks
Before going on to solve the post-merger equilibrium, we ﬁrst provide a brief overview of the
method of resolution. As compared with the pre-merger situation, the post-merger setting
exhibits a third parameter that impacts prices, proﬁts and welfare: the (exogenous) amount of
cost savings generated by the merger. In order to compare the post- and pre-merger situations,
we compute the threshold values of merger cost savings that keep prices, proﬁts and welfare
(both consumers’ and total) constant. This way we are able to state how much eﬃciency gains
a given merger type (between neighbor or distant platforms) needs to generate in order to be
proﬁtable, to also beneﬁt consumers, and to improve welfare. Since these threshold values of cost
savings are likely to depend on the cross-group externality and the relative valuation between
sides, we also pinpoint the impact of these parameters (a and β) for the comparison between
the post- and pre-merger situations.
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For tractability reasons, we ignore the merger’s possible impact on locations, i.e., we rule out
post-merger product repositioning, as well as the possibility for the merger to trigger changes
in the number of active outlets or products.25 Also, we assume that although the merger does
give access to more users/business partners on the other side of the market, this will not change
their willingness to pay or intrinsic utility from joining a platform26. In other words, we assume
that the merger only changes the ownership pattern in the industry, thus leading to a joint
pricing decision for the merging platforms, but it will not alter the type of equilibrium that the
platforms play, nor the users’ preferences.
We obtain throughout closed-form post-merger solutions for the eight equilibrium prices27,
four equilibrium proﬁts, and also consumers’ and total welfare expressions. However, they are
far too much space-consuming to be displayed in the text, so we relegate all this to the Technical
Appendix. The latter also contains the detailed proofs for all results in the rest of the paper.
In the main text we only provide the sketches for the proofs of all our results. Finally, for
illustrative purposes, the Appendix A2 at the end of the paper provides the detailed resolution
in a particular case, that of perfect symmetry between the two market sides (β = 1).
4.2 Joint proﬁt maximization
As before mentioned, our four-platform framework makes possible the analysis of two types of
(exogenous) mergers: either between adjacent/neighbor or between distant platforms. Below
we characterize the post-merger market equilibrium in terms of prices, proﬁts, and resulting
(consumers’ and total) welfare in both cases, while recalling ﬁrst that they are not outcome-
equivalent in the "standard"/one-sided market analysis.
25When ﬁrms sell diﬀerentiated products, maintaining all outlets after the merger is less of an issue than if they
sell homogenous goods. This actually points at the question of interoperability between the merged platforms
when they are kept separate after the merger - recall for instance that after the acquisition of Waze, Google
allowed direct navigation between Google Maps and Waze.
26We do not consider an exogenous increase in the intrinsic customer valuation after the merger, but focus
instead on the increases in the net utility from joining a platform that comes from the fact that the change of
ownership through merger provides access to a greater pool of business partners on the other side.
27Since we assume that the merger does not close down one of the participating platforms, post-merger there
are still eight equilibrium prices to be determined.
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In particular, a merger without cost savings between neighbor ﬁrms competing in prices on
the circular market leads to price increases for all ﬁrms on the market, but the farther away the
outsiders, the weaker their price increase (Levy and Reitzes, 1992). In turn, the merger between
distant ﬁrms does not aﬀect prices, nor proﬁts, in the absence of cost savings, simply because
for the market-power price-increasing eﬀect to arise, the two merger ﬁrms need some captive
demand. This eﬀect is missing when they are not neighbors. Thus, the spatial literature on
horizontal mergers between ﬁrms competing in prices on the circular market (Levy and Reitzes,
1992, Brito, 2003, 2005) concludes that a bilateral merger between neighbors, which necessarily
involves a unilateral market power eﬀect, is always proﬁtable, whereas a merger between non
adjacent ﬁrms can only be motivated either by cost savings or possibly to better sustain collusion.
We, in contrast, allow for merger cost savings: the merged platform will operate with a lower
constant unit cost, the same across sides28, as compared with the remaining outsider platforms.
As a result, the merger turns each side of the circular market into a cost-asymmetric triopoly.
Nonetheless, for both types of mergers (between adjacent or distant platforms), the resulting
post-merger triopoly preserves the symmetry between the two insiders and the two outsiders
respectively.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case of the merger between adjacent platforms, say A and B. Denote
c− δ the unit cost for the group A+B, with δ ≥ 0. Then the merged entity solves
max
pA
1
,pA
2
,pB
1
,pB
2

ΠA +ΠB

=

 (pA1 − c+ δ)

x
A,D
1 + x
A,B
1

+ (pA2 − c+ δ)

x
A,D
2 + x
A,B
2

+(pB1 − c+ δ)

x
B,C
1 + x
B,A
1

+ (pB2 − c+ δ)

x
B,C
2 + x
B,A
2


 ,
(10)
28We assume the same cost reduction through merger on both sides because we only consider merger synergies,
i.e. the type of cost savings that competition agencies recognize as capable of being transferred, through lower
prices, to consumers/users. One essential feature of marginal cost reductions to be recognized as merger synergies
is their speciﬁcity: they should not be available other than through the submitted merger (see the EU Merger
Regulation 139/2004 for instance). In our context, assuming the same cost savings on both sides satisﬁes this
constraint, since our assumption clearly makes these eﬃciencies merger-, and not side-, speciﬁc.
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whereas the platforms C and D keep on maximizing their stand-alone proﬁts:
max
pC
1
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2
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
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
, (11)
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
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2 + x
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2

. (12)
All SOCs are satisﬁed for a < 0.5 (see Appendix A1 at the end of the paper).
Let us now consider the alternative type of merger, i.e., between distant platforms, say A
and C. Again, assuming equal cost savings between sides, the merged platform will operate
with a lower constant unit cost as compared with the remaining outsider platforms. Denote now
c−∆ the unit cost for A+C, with ∆ ≥ 0. Then the merged entity will solve
max
pA
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(13)
whereas the platforms B and D go on maximizing their stand-alone proﬁts:
max
pB
1
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2
ΠB = (pB1 − c)
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max
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
+ (pD2 − c)
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x
D,A
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2

. (15)
Again, all SOCs are satisﬁed for a < 0.5 (see Appendix A1 at the end of the paper).
We further check that the post-merger equilibrium is actually a triopoly and not a monopoly,
i.e., that the merger cost savings do not force the outsider platforms out of the market. Since
the outsiders’ market share on each side of the market is linear and decreasing in the eﬃciency
gains parameter whatever the merger type (see the Technical Appendix), the following holds:.
Remark For each type of merger and for each side of the market there exists a strictly
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positive level of merger eﬃciency gains such that the outsider platforms hold each (through
symmetry) a zero market share.
In the Technical Appendix we check that all relevant thresholds that we discuss in the
remaining of the paper, i.e., for merger proﬁtability as well as price- and welfare-eﬀects, are
always below this upper bound of merger cost savings.
5 Results
We begin the analysis of the merger’s outcome, and ﬁrst discuss the impact on prices, before
moving on to proﬁts and ﬁnally welfare.
5.1 Price eﬀect of mergers on two-sided markets
Generally speaking, the post-merger prices of insider platforms will result from a trade-oﬀ be-
tween two opposing eﬀects. On the one hand, the indirect externality gives rise to a demand
increase, which provides incentives to increase price. But on the other hand, giving access to
users or consumers to both outlets encourages the latter to drop the price (each outlet inter-
nalizing the new users that it serves). Outsider platforms will take into account the insiders’
incentives to modify prices when determining their own. We establish below to what extent the
factoring in of merger cost savings impacts this trade-oﬀ:
Lemma 2 Whatever the merger type (between adjacent or distant platforms), there is a unique
threshold of merger cost savings on each side of the market such that the insiders’ (outsiders’)
price is the same as before merger. This threshold is generally non-monotonic in the level of
cross-group externality and the relative valuation between sides.
Sketch of proof. All post-/pre-merger price diﬀerentials (i.e., on each side of the market,
and for both insider and outsider platforms) are linear in the eﬃciency gains parameter.
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In the Technical Appendix we compute the best reply functions for both insider and outsider
platforms on each side and for both types of merger. They are always linear in the eﬃciency
gains parameter, which explains the uniqueness result provided by Lemma 2. Furthermore, the
unique threshold keeping the insiders’/outsiders’ prices constant on each side of the market turns
out to be not monotonic w.r.t. either a or β. This is due to the fact that the insiders’/outsiders’
best reply functions on either side are decreasing in the insiders’/outsiders’ own price on the
opposite side, but increasing with the rivals’(outsiders’/insiders’) prices on both sides.
The resulting impact of the merger on equilibrium prices is provided below by Propositions
1 and 2 (for the adjacent and distant mergers respectively):
Proposition 1 The adjacent merger only leads to lower prices, for both insider and outsider
platforms, and on each side of the market, iﬀ it generates enough cost savings.
Sketch of proof. The synergy thresholds keeping prices constant (for both insider and
outsider platforms, and for each side of the market) are strictly positive.
Proposition 1 states the optimal post-merger price behavior in case of adjacent merger. It
basically extends the standard trade-oﬀ between cost savings and market power for post-merger
pricing behavior to the two-sided framework. To better grasp this result, recall that the cross-
group externality favors customers to the extent that it provides incentives for ﬁrms to lower
their prices so as to better beneﬁt from the ensuing increase in demand. But in the case of an
adjacent merger, the merger also involves a market-power eﬀect, pushing the price upwards for
the insider platforms, which fully internalize the fact that they enjoy captive demand on both
sides from users located between them. The market-power eﬀect of the merger dominates the
incentives to lower the price provided by the cross-group externality, and it takes high enough
cost savings for the insider platforms to eventually lower their price. Note that the outsider
platforms also lower their prices: they do not beneﬁt from cost savings, so the price drop is the
only strategy enabling them to minimize demand loss due to the insiders’ aggressive pricing.
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Turning now to the merger between distant platforms, we ﬁnd that the following holds:
Proposition 2 The distant merger generally leads to lower prices, absent any eﬃciency gains:
(i) On the side that values relatively less the presence of the other side, both the insider
and the outsider platforms always lower their prices (i.e., regardless of the amount of merger
synergies);
(ii) Optimal post-merger pricing on the side that values relatively more the presence of the
other side depends on the valuation it gets from the other side: when side 1 is valued by side 2
(β ≥ 0), the insider platforms may need enough cost savings to drop their price after merger,
but not the outsider platforms (they always lower their price); instead, when side 1 is disliked
by side 2 (β < 0), the insiders always need cost savings to drop their prices post-merger, but the
outsider platforms may not.
Sketch of proof. (i) the thresholds of merger synergies keeping prices constant (both for
the insider and the outsider platforms) on side 2 are strictly negative;
(ii) result obtained for side 1 by signing the threshold levels of merger synergy keeping prices
constant for both merging and non-merging platforms when β ≥ 0 and β < 0 respectively.
Proposition 2 provides the equilibrium price behavior after a distant merger, depending not
only on the amount of merger cost savings, but also on the market side and the relative valuation
between sides. More precisely, it is necessary to distinguish between the side that is more valued
and the side that values relatively more in order to understand the rationale behind the optimal
price-setting behavior after the distant merger.
Part (i) of Proposition 2 deals with the optimal post-merger pricing on the side that is
relatively more valued. Recall that distant ﬁrms share no captive demand between them, so on
traditional, one-sided markets, such a merger would not aﬀect prices absent cost savings. This
is not the case here: on side 2, the insider platforms do not need any merger synergies to drop
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their price, and this is due to the cross-group externality: given that side 1 values side 2, a price
drop on side 2 will trigger increased demand on (and higher revenue from) side 1. The optimal
reply from the outsider platforms will be similar: not only do they lack cost savings to cope
with the insiders’ demand increase, but they are stuck between the insiders as well, meaning
they lose demand both to the left and to the right on side 1. Note that part (i) of Proposition 2
equally highlights the extent to which cost savings and indirect network eﬀects are substitutable
for the merging platforms: the former are not necessary for prices to drop on one side of the
market, the one that is valued relatively more.
Part (ii) of Proposition 2 deals with optimal post-merger pricing behavior on side 1, the
one which exhibits the higher valuation for the opposite side. The mechanism explaining it is
actually more complex, because it hinges on whether side 2 users value or not the presence of
side 1 users.
Whenever side 2 does value the presence of side 1 (β ≥ 0), insider platforms may need
high enough cost savings to drop their price on side 1. More precisely, this happens when the
relative valuation between sides is quite low (β → 0): in fact, the lower β, the more cost savings
are necessary for the insider platforms to lower their price post-merger. In contrast, outsider
platforms always drop their price on side 1 when β ≥ 0. The intuition is the following: there
is now an opportunity cost for the insiders to lower their price on side 1, because the induced
demand gain on side 2 is very weak (β is very low). This trade-oﬀ is only solved through the
presence of enough cost savings making it optimal to lower the price. In turn, it is always optimal
for the outsider platforms to respond by dropping their price on side 1, precisely because they
lack cost savings, so this is the only way to cope with the insiders’ aggressive pricing on side 2.
In the opposite case, where side 2 dislikes side 1 (β < 0), the insider platforms always drop
their price on side 1 for high enough cost savings, while the outsiders do so only if the relative
valuation between sides, β, is negative enough. To see this, recall the opportunity cost that
the merging platforms face when they contemplate lowering their price on side 1: there is now
no additional demand from side 2, because side 2 users do not value side 1 users. So basically
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insiders face now a one-sided-market situation: any price drop on side 1 will only bring about
a relatively small gain in demand, i.e., on side 1 only, so they need high enough cost savings
to compensate for the negative price eﬀect and make this price drop become optimal. The
outsiders’ response however is now more complex. For a weak dislike of side 2 for side 1 (β only
weakly negative), the outsider platforms drop their price on side 1 regardless of the merger’s
eﬃciency gains: this enables them to amplify the eﬀect of their own price drop on side 2, i.e., a
demand increase on side 1. In other words, the weak dislike of side 2 for side 1 gives rise to a
situation where the outsiders face a high opportunity cost if they do not price aggressively on
side 1. In turn, with very strong dislike of side 2 for side 1 (β strongly negative, close to −1),
this opportunity cost for outsiders is much lower: as a result, they will now mimic the insiders’
price behavior, i.e., drop their price only for high enough cost savings. Note that for the outsider
platforms this basically comes down to facing a one-sided-market situation as well, due to the
strong asymmetry in terms of valuation between sides: they now focus on side 1 exclusively and
given the less aggressive pricing by the insider platforms (only drop the price for high enough
cost savings), they can aﬀord to do the same.
Finally, note that for both the adjacent and distant merger, the following holds:
Corollary 1 Regardless of the intensity of the cross-group externality and relative valuation
between sides, both the insiders and the outsiders drop their price "ﬁrst" on side 2 (i.e., for a
lower amount of cost savings generated by the merger) and only "afterwards" on side 1 (i.e., for
a higher amount of merger synergies).
Sketch of proof. Result obtained by signing the diﬀerence between the respective synergy
thresholds.
Corollary 1 further clariﬁes the post-merger optimal pricing behavior: on the side that values
less the presence of the other side, all prices drop for lower levels of merger synergies than on the
side exhibiting a higher valuation for the opposite side. The intuition is quite straightforward
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actually, and runs as follows. The insiders start lowering their price "ﬁrst", meaning for a lower
amount of cost savings, on the side that will give them the highest return in terms of additional
cross-sides demand, here side 2. The strategic reason is that the latter is more valued by side
1, so dropping the price "ﬁrst" on side 2 gives them a higher gain on side 1 than they would
obtain on side 2 if instead they dropped the price "ﬁrst" on side 1. The outsiders will do the
same through strategic complementarity.
Before going on to discuss the resulting impact of these pricing strategies on proﬁts, let us
summarize the takeaways so far:
(i) for the merger between adjacent platforms, the analysis of post-merger pricing behavior
yields quite similar results to the case of one-sided markets, to the extent that cost savings are
always necessary for prices to drop; this is not generally the case for the merger between distant
platforms (Propositions 1 and 2);
(ii) for both types of merger, a price drop on one side of the market from all ﬁrms is
compatible, for a given amount of merger cost savings, with a simultaneous price increase (for
all platforms) on the opposite side (Corollary 1).29
5.2 Merger proﬁtability on two-sided markets
It is important to look into the outcome of pricing decisions for the proﬁts of the merged
platforms for at least one obvious reason: consumers would not be aﬀected whatsoever by the
merger if the latter is not submitted in the ﬁrst place. The following proposition provides the
results we obtain for the (internal) proﬁtability of mergers on two-sided markets:
Proposition 3 (i) Merging is always proﬁtable for neighboring platforms, regardless of the
amount of cost savings;
29The only exception occurs for β = 1, i.e. identical positive valuation between sides, in which case the
thresholds for price changes are the same for the insider and outsider platforms, whatever the side considered.
See Appendix A2 at the end of the paper.
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(ii) Distant platforms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to merge only for enough cost savings.
Sketch of proof. Whatever the merger type, the insiders’ joint proﬁt is convex in the
eﬃciency gains parameter, with two real roots, one of each is always strictly negative. The other
root is therefore the relevant threshold for the proﬁtability analysis: it represents the minimum
amount of cost savings that guarantee merger proﬁtability for the insider platforms. For the
adjacent merger, the second root is also negative, hence the merger increases the insiders’ proﬁt
for any level of positive merger synergies. For the distant merger, the second root is positive,
meaning that distant platforms need enough cost savings for their merger to be proﬁtable.
Note that Proposition 3 provides a direct extension of proﬁtability results obtained in the one-
sided case (Levy & Reitzes 1992, Brito 2005). The intuition is straightforward: adjacent ﬁrms
beneﬁt from captive demand located between them and will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to merge thanks
to this market power eﬀect, even without cost savings. In turn, distant insiders have no captive
demand between them, therefore their merger cannot be proﬁtable through the exploitation of
a market power eﬀect. Then the only way left for this merger to be proﬁtable is through merger
cost savings. Recall that following the distant merger the insider platforms lower their prices (on
both sides), which triggers additional demand for them. Hence it takes high enough cost savings
to make the distant merger proﬁtable (by guaranteeing a high enough increase in demand to
compensate for the lower margin).
5.3 Welfare impact of mergers on two-sided markets
In what follows we examine the impact of mergers on welfare: both consumers’ and total.
Although most competition agencies enforce a consumer surplus standard for merger assessment,
some allow for the total welfare standard to play a role in their decision. We ﬁnd that:
Proposition 4 (i) The adjacent merger only increases consumers’ surplus on either side for
high enough cost savings;
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(ii) the distant merger always increases consumers’ surplus on both sides.
Sketch of proof. Whatever the merger type, the consumers’ surplus functions (one for each
side of the market, and consolidated across sides) are convex in the eﬃciency gains parameter,
with two real roots, one being always strictly negative. For the adjacent merger, the second
root is always strictly positive, whatever the side considered, whereas for the distant merger it
is always strictly negative, regardless of the side considered.
Proposition 4 summarizes results for the impact of each type of merger on consumers’ surplus:
analyzing side by side, the distant merger always improves consumers’ welfare, whereas the
adjacent merger only does so for high enough cost savings. This is actually quite intuitive, since
consumers’ surplus is decreasing in the price paid by users.
Let us start with the distant merger: in this case, all post-merger prices drop most of the
time. They actually always drop on the side which values less the presence of the other side (side
2), i.e., regardless of the level of cost savings, hence post-merger consumers’ surplus necessarily
always increases on this side. However, on the side that values more the presence of the other
side (side 1), post-merger prices may go down for both the insiders and the outsiders only for
high enough cost savings, in particular when β < 0. But then it is worth recalling that users’
utility is positively aﬀected by the cross-group externality, which is positive from side 1 to side
2. In other words, Proposition 4 establishes that on side 1, the additional utility derived from
interacting with more users on the opposite side more than compensates for the non-decrease
in price whenever the cost savings are not high enough to trigger a price drop, thus yielding a
consumers’ surplus increase as well.
Note that the very same situation is potentially present for the adjacent merger on either
side: a consumers’ surplus trade-oﬀ between the additional utility derived from interacting with
more users on the opposite side on the one hand, and the non-decrease in price whenever the
cost savings are not high enough to trigger a price drop on the other hand. However, and in
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contrast to the distant merger case, consumers’ surplus does not increase after the adjacent
merger unless the merger synergies are high enough, despite the positive utility eﬀect of the
cross-group externality. This is due to the fact that the amount of cost savings needed to makes
prices drop post-merger is higher for the adjacent merger than for the distant merger30, and this
is to be put down to the presence of a market-power eﬀect for the adjacent merger.
For the latter, an additional result holds:
Corollary 2 For the adjacent merger, a given amount of cost savings can lead to a consumer
surplus increase on one side but a consumer surplus decrease on the other.
Sketch of proof. Result obtained by signing the diﬀerence between the synergy levels
keeping constant the consumers’ surplus for each side.
Corollary 2 states that the thresholds of merger synergies keeping consumers’ surplus con-
stant after the adjacent merger may diﬀer across sides. In other words, for the same amount
of cost savings, users on one side may beneﬁt from the merger while those on the opposite side
may be hurt by it. This is due to the fact that the constant-price thresholds of cost savings are
diﬀerent across sides for both insider and outsider platforms.31 As a result, for the purposes of
the ﬁnal decision to be made by the competition authority, the merger’s net eﬀect on customers
would likely involve balancing one side’s gain against the other side’s loss.
Turning now to the total welfare outcome of the two types of mergers, we ﬁrst note the
following:
Lemma 3 (i) The outsiders to the adjacent merger incur a proﬁt loss as soon as the merger
cost savings are high enough.
(ii) The outsiders to the distant merger always incur a proﬁt loss, i.e., whatever the level of
merger cost savings.
30See the Technical Appendix.
31Unless β = 1 of course, in which case these thresholds are identical on each side - see the explicit example in
the Appendix A2 at the end of the paper.
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Sketch of proof. (i) The proﬁt diﬀerential for the outsider platforms to the adjacent
merger is convex in the eﬃciency gains parameter. Both roots are positive, but one is above the
threshold of eﬃciency gains for which demand served by the outsider platforms becomes zero.
Hence, post-merger the outsiders only make a higher proﬁt as long as the merger’s synergy level
is lower than the ﬁrst root of their proﬁt diﬀerential; for higher values they make a lower proﬁt
than before merger;
(ii) The proﬁt diﬀerential for the outsider platforms to the distant merger is convex in the
eﬃciency gains parameter. One root is always positive and higher than the threshold of eﬃciency
gains for which demand served by the outsider platforms becomes zero. The other root is always
lower than the minimum threshold of eﬃciency gains for which the merger is internally proﬁtable.
Thus the outsider platforms always make a lower proﬁt than before merger.
Both parts of Lemma 3 are quite intuitive, and stem from the post-merger equilibrium price
behavior. To see this, recall that the only way for the outsiders to beneﬁt from a merger, given
their lack of cost savings, is through the merger’s strategic, market-power eﬀect, which enables
them to raise prices without losing demand. But when the outsider platforms are forced to lower
their prices, in response to the aggressive pricing by the more cost-eﬃcient insiders, they end
up making a lower margin and also serving a lower demand too. Hence the outsiders cannot
but make a lower proﬁt than before merger. The post-merger price drop occurs if the merger
cost savings are high enough in the case of adjacent insiders, and always (i.e., regardless of the
amount of merger eﬃciencies) in the case of distant insiders.
Based on Propositions 3 and 4 as well as on Lemma 3, Proposition 5 below concludes on the
total welfare impact of the two merger types:
Proposition 5 Both types of merger increase total welfare for high enough cost savings.
27
Sketch of proof. Total welfare functions (one for each type of merger) are convex in the
eﬃciency gains parameter, with two real roots, one being always strictly negative. The second
root is always strictly positive in the case of the adjacent merger. For the distant merger, the
second root becomes negative only for high enough values of a and β.
Proposition 5 states that both types of merger, and perhaps a little unexpectedly not only
the adjacent one, will be Pareto-improving only for high enough synergies. Recall that after the
adjacent merger enough cost savings are required to ensure that consumers’ surplus increases.
However, insiders’ proﬁts always increase afterwards, whereas the outsiders incur a proﬁt loss
if the cost savings are high enough. Thus, for high enough cost savings, the adjacent merger’s
positive impact on consumers and insiders more than compensates the outsiders’ proﬁt loss, and
hence total welfare increases. A similar trade-oﬀ plays out in the case of the distant merger: the
insiders’ proﬁt only increases for high enough eﬃciency gains, but the outsiders’ proﬁt always
drops, while consumers’ surplus always increases. Again, there is a trade-oﬀ, and for high
enough cost savings, the distant merger’s positive impact on consumers and insiders more than
compensates the outsiders’ proﬁt loss, allowing for total welfare to increase. Note that this
trade-oﬀ completely vanishes for a high enough positive reciprocal externality between sides (a
and β high enough): this is actually quite intuitive, since it is for such parameter values that the
parties that beneﬁt from the interoperability between the merging platforms, that is the users
and the merging ﬁrms, actually do so to the fullest.
6 Discussion and concluding remarks
This paper focuses on the role played by the merger cost savings for the outcome of horizontal
mergers between two-sided platforms. Our model considers four symmetrically diﬀerentiated
platforms located equidistantly on the unit circle market and competing in membership fees.
Users on both sides single-home, and we allow for both positive and negative cross-group exter-
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nalities, as well as for bilateral mergers between either adjacent, closely substitutable platforms,
or between distant, less substitutable ones.
We ﬁnd that the adjacent platform merger will only lead to lower prices on either side
iﬀ it generates enough cost savings, regardless of the relative valuation sides exhibit for one
another.32 In contrast, cost savings may not be necessary to achieve this outcome for the distant
merger: post-merger prices always drop on the side that values relatively less the opposite side.
Moreover, for both types of merger, all platforms lower their prices "ﬁrst", i.e., for a lower
amount of merger’s cost savings, on the side that is relatively more valued, because it will give
them the highest return in terms of additional cross-sides demand. Our analysis also provides
some insights for the merger proﬁtability: we actually extend in this respect the results obtained
in the standard, one-sided framework, in particular the fact that merging is always proﬁtable
for neighboring ﬁrms/platforms, but for distant ﬁrms/platforms only if there are enough cost
savings. Regarding the welfare impact of the mergers, we ﬁnd that the distant merger always
improves consumers’ surplus, i.e., on both sides and regardless of the amount of merger cost
savings. On the contrary, the adjacent merger only beneﬁts users on either side for high enough
eﬃciency gains. In terms of aggregate welfare eﬀect, both types of platform mergers are found
to be Pareto-improving only for high enough cost savings. Finally, we show in the case of
merger between adjacent platforms that the two sides may face post-merger opposite price and
consumers’ surplus eﬀects, for a given amount of cost savings from the merger, with one side
beneﬁtting from the merger while the other one being harmed by it. This raises some interesting
questions for the practice of competition agencies when enforcing merger control on two-sided
markets.
32To a certain extent, this result provides a formal background for the EC’s prohibition decision in the Deutsche
Börse - NYSE Euronext merger case (EC Case No. M.6166). The EC considered that the eﬃciency gains argued
by the merging parties would be insuﬃcient to compensate for the likely anticompetitive concern raised by the
expected increase in concentration (up to 90%) on the European market for exchange-traded derivatives (for an
evaluation of horizontal merger eﬃciencies on multi-sided markets, in particular for stock exchange mergers such
as Deutsche Börse - NYSE Euronext, see OECD 2018, Part V, Ch. 7). In our framework, this would mirror the
case of closely-substitutble platforms with positive reciprocal valuation between sides, for which cost savings are
necessary in order for prices (on either side) to not increase.
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To start with, both in the US and in the EU, competition law prohibits mergers that raise
anti-competitive concerns in the relevant market, even when these concerns may be outweighed
by eﬃciencies in another market.33 Accordingly, even if the beneﬁt for consumers outside the
market deﬁned as relevant is higher than the welfare loss of consumers in that relevant market,
the merger would not be cleared even though it may be welfare-increasing. This general principle
on how to take into account merger eﬃciencies, in particular the out-of-market ones, turns
out to be crucial in a two-sided context, where two or more set of users are necessarily and
above all closely interconnected.34 Moreover, it draws attention to the proper deﬁnition of the
"relevant market" in case of platform mergers, given that recent front-page judicial decisions
recognized that both sides of platform markets must be considered when assessing market power
and establishing the existence of adverse eﬀects on competition.35 Furthermore, if a platform
merger were to be only conditionally cleared due to opposite consumer eﬀects on the two sides,
the question of appropriate, side-wise, remedies would need to be addressed as well.
Arguably, several robustness checks may be contemplated in relation with the formal setting
we used for our analysis. It would be relevant to consider alternative assumptions, such as
multi-homing customers36 for instance, or non-localized competition among platforms, which
could also be non symmetrically diﬀerentiated, and so on. By the same token, usage fees or
33The EU merger regulation completely disregards out-of-market eﬃciencies, since it establishes that eﬃciencies
should, in principle, beneﬁt consumers in those relevant markets where it is likely that competition harm would
occur (Commission Notice, Guidelines On The Assessment Of Horizontal Mergers Under The Council Regulation
On The Control Of Concentrations Between Undertakings, OJ 2004 C31/03, at para 79). In the US, the latest
version of US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, from 2010, allows to some extent to take into account cross-market
eﬃciencies, since it explicitly states that the analysis should focus on whether “the merger is likely to beneﬁt
customers overall” (see US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines
(2010), at 30, note 14). However, the evaluation of out-of-market eﬃciencies is still conditioned on the "prosecu-
torial discretion" of the antitrust agencies. In stark contrast, the Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelinesclearly
state (section 12.23) that "In addition to direct eﬀects in the relevant market, the Bureau also considers price
and non-price eﬀects in interrelated markets."
34For a discussion of out-of-market eﬀciencies and competition analysis of two-sided platform markets, see Ducci
(2016).
35See United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 197-98, 202-05 (2d Cir. 2016), and Case C-67/13 P,
Groupement des Cartes Bancaires (CB) v. European Commission, 2014 E.C.R.2204.
36The nature of competition among platforms would be substantially changed in this case, and the literature
on media markets indicates that the merger eﬀects are diﬀerent from when marginal consumers single-home
(Anderson et al., 2018).
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two-part tariﬀs would be interesting to assume instead of our linear access fees.37 The industrial
organization literature on two-sided platforms has yet to produce such a more general but still
tractable framework for the analysis of horizontal mergers among two-sided platforms, and we
leave these robustness checks for later research.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A1 - The SOCs
Before merger, the SOCs require that 5βa
2−2
1−5βa2+4β2a4
< 0 and−14 6β2a3−10βa2−3βa+4+6βa3−3a(4βa2−1)2 6β2a3−4−3βa−3a+10βa2+6βa3(βa2−1)2 > 0 respectively.
After the adjacent merger, they require that:
for the merged platforms, A and B:
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5βa2−2
1−5βa2+4β2a4
< 0,
−14 (6β2a3−10βa2−3βa+4+6βa3−3a)(6β2a3−4−3βa−3a+10βa2+6βa3)(4βa2−1)2(βa2−1)2 > 0,−14 (44a6β4+88a6β3−49β3a4+44a6β2−218β2a2+14β2a2−49a4β+136βa2+14a2−24)(4βa2−1)2(βa2−1)3 < 0 and
1
16
(βa+2+a)(βa−2+a)(8β2a3−6−5βa−5a+12βa2+8a3β)(8β2a3+6−5βa−5a−12βa2+8a3β)
(4βa2−1)2(βa2−1)4
> 0.
for the outsider platforms, either C or D:
5βa2−2
1−5βa2+4β2a4
< 0 and
−14 (6β2a3−10βa2−3βa+4+6βa3−3a)(6β2a3−4−3βa−3a+10βa2+6βa3)(4βa2−1)2(βa2−1)2 > 0.
After the distant merger, the SOC require that:
for the merged platforms, A and C:
5βa2−2
1−5βa2+4β2a4
< 0,
−14 (6β2a3−10βa2−3βa+4+6βa3−3a)(6β2a3−4−3βa−3a+10βa2+6βa3)(4βa2−1)2(βa2−1)2 > 0,
−(8β
3a4+16β2a4−5β2a2+8a4β−30βa2+8−5a2)
(4βa2−1)2(βa2−1)2
< 0, and 4(βa+2+a)(βa−2+a)(βa−1+a)(βa+1+a)
(4βa2−1)2(βa2−1)2
> 0.
for the outsider platforms, either B or D:
5βa2−2
1−5βa2+4β2a4
< 0 and
−14 (6β2a3−10βa2−3βa+4+6βa3−3a)(6β2a3−4−3βa−3a+10βa2+6βa3)(4βa2−1)2(βa2−1)2 > 0.
7.2 Appendix A2 - The perfectly symmetric case
We consider here the case where β = 1 and solve analytically the post-merger equilibrium. Below
we provide the detailed computations for equilibrium proﬁts and prices, while distinguishing the
two types of merger we consider, between adjacent and distant platforms.
• Merger between adjacent platforms (A+B merger)
With β = 1, post-merger proﬁts for the insiders and outsiders write respectively as follows:
ΠA+B = 12 (4δ−11a−6aδ+4+7a2)2(1−a)(5−8a)2 and ΠC = ΠD = 14 (2a−1)1−a (3a−2)(3a−3+2δ)2(5−8a)2 ≡ ΠO.
SOCs
Whenever the SOCs are satisﬁed the Hessian matrices for all proﬁt functions are negative
deﬁnite (ND). We deﬁne below the Hessian matrix HA+B for the merged ﬁrm and HC,D for the
outsider proﬁts:
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HA+B = N1−4a2


1
−a2+1

5a2 − 4 3 a
−a2+1

2a2 − 1 1 2a
3 a
−a2+1

2a2 − 1 1
−a2+1

5a2 − 2 2a 1
1 2a 1
−a2+1

5a2 − 2 3 a
−a2+1

2a2 − 1
2a 1 3 a
−a2+1

2a2 − 1 1
−a2+1

5a2 − 2


and HC,D = 1(1−a2)(1−4a2)

 5a2 − 2 3a

2a2 − 1
3a

2a2 − 1 5a2 − 2

 .
In order for HA+B and HC,D to be ND the following principal minor conditions need to be
fulﬁlled:
- for the merged ﬁrm:
HA+B1  = 5a2−24a4−5a2+1 < 0, HA+B2  = − 9a2−44a4−5a2+1 > 0, HA+B3  =
− 11a2−6
4a4−5a2+1
< 0,
HA+B4  = 16a2−94a4−5a2+1 > 0;
- for each outsider:
HC,D1  = 5a2−24a4−5a2+1 < 0, HC,D2  = − 9a2−44a4−5a2+1 > 0.
The SOCs are satisﬁed for a < 0.5.
Equilibrium prices
Due to the symmetry between the insider platforms, as well as between the outsiders, the
following optimal post-merger prices obtain for the insider and outsider platforms respectively:
pA+B = c+ 10aδ−6δ−11a+7a2+410−16a and pC = pD = c+ 4aδ−2δ−9a+6a2+310−16a . Note that pA+B − c+ δ ≥ 0,
∀δ ∈ [0, c] , but pC − c ≥ 0 iﬀ δ ≤ 32(1− a) ≡ δ.
Let f(δ, a) stand for the post-/pre-merger price diﬀerence for the insider platforms on ei-
ther side of the market. Then f(δ, a) = pA+B − p∗ = (3−5a)(6aδ−4δ−2a+1+a2)(4−6a)(5−8a) . By the same
token, the outsider-platform price diﬀerence between merger and no-merger on either side of
the market writes h(δ, a) = pC − p∗ = 12 (1−2a)(6aδ−4δ−2a+1+a2)(2−3a)(5−8a) . It is straightforward to check
that ∂
∂δ
f(δ, a) = 3−5a8a−5 < 0 and
∂
∂δ
h(δ, a) = 1−2a8a−5 < 0. Note also that f(
δ, a) = h(δ, a) = 0 for
δ = (a−1)22(2−3a) > 0, where δ < δ for any a < 0.5. Thus f(0, a) ≤ 0 and h(0, a) ≤ 0 for δ ∈ δ, δ.
Equilibrium proﬁts
The proﬁt diﬀerentials (post/pre-merger) for insiders and outsiders are given by
ΠA+B − 2Π∗ = 4(2−3a)3δ2+4(4−7a)(1−a)(2−3a)2δ+(19a2−23a+7)(1−a)3
2(1−a)(8a−5)2(2−3a)
and
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ΠO −Π∗ = (1− 2a) (4−6a)2δ2−12(1−a)(3a−2)2δ+(1−a)3(11−17a)
4(1−a)(2−3a)(8a−5)2
respectively.
We have that ΠA+B−2Π∗ = 0 if δ = δ1 or δ = δ2, where both roots are negative for a < 0.5,
i.e. ΠA+B − 2Π∗ > 0.
Similarly, ΠO −Π∗ = 0 for δO1 = (1−a)22(2−3a) = δ and δO2 = (11−17a)(1−a)2(2−3a) .
We have that 0 < δO1 < δ < δO2 for any a < 0.5, and thus ΠO −Π∗ ≤ 0 for δ ∈ δ, δ .
Consumers’ surplus
We can at ﬁrst compare the diﬀerence of consumers’ surplus between post and pre-merger
on each side (note that since β = 1, the diﬀerence is the same for side 1and side 2 )
g(δ, a) = CSA+Bi + 2CS
o
i − CS with i = 1, 2, where CSA+Bi , CSoi and CS respectively the
consumers’ surplus from the merger A+B, the consumers’ surplus when users are connected to
the outsiders, and the consumers’ surplus in the pre-merger case. Note that the overall diﬀerence
in consumers’ surplus is just 2

CSA+Bi + 2CS
o
i −CS

. We can prove that g(0, a) < 0.
Basically, for g(δ, a) = 0 there exist two roots δCSAB1 < 0 and δ
CSAB
2 > 0, where
δCSAB2 = −14

112 a3−240 a2+164 a−36+
√
(196 a4−616 a3+717 a2−364 a+68)(−5+8 a)2

(a−1)
(3 a−2)2
.
And we can conclude that the adjacent merger improve the consumers’ surplus on each
side (β = 1) for high enough cost savings, i.e. for δ ≥ δ2. Moreover, the overall diﬀerence in
consumers’ surplus is just 2

CSA+Bi + 2CS
o
i −CS

, so we reach the same conclusion.
Welfare comparison
The diﬀerence between the post and the pre-merger welfare provides a functionWA+B(δ, a),
for which there exists two roots δWAB1 < 0 and δ
WAB
2 > 0, with W
A+B(δ, a) = 0, and
WA+B(0, a) < 0, where δWAB2 =
1
4

124 a3−272 a2+192 a−44+
√
(244 a4−798 a3+961 a2−502 a+96)(−5+8 a)2

(a−1)
(3 a−2)(10 a2−19 a+8)
.
We can conclude that the adjacent merger is welfare improving for high enough cost savings.
• Merger between distant platforms (A+C merger)
For β = 1 post-merger equilibrium proﬁts write as follows:
ΠA+C =76a5 − 1008a4δ − 196a4 +2712a3δ+187a3 +432δ2a3 − 864a2δ2 − 78a2 − 2704δa2 +
1184aδ + 12a+ 576aδ2 − 192δ − 128δ2
16(3a−2)(1−2a)(4 a−3)2
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ΠB = ΠD =(3a− 2) (a− 1) (6a+ 4δ − 3)2
16(1−2a)(4a−3)2
≡ ΠO.
SOCs
Whenever the SOCs are satisﬁed the Hessian matrices for all proﬁt functions are negative
deﬁnite (ND). We deﬁne below the Hessian matrices for the merged entity and for the outsiders:
- for the merged entity (A+C):
HA+C = 1(1−a2)(1−4a2)


5a2 − 2 3a 2a2 − 1 −3a2 −a 2a2 + 1
3a

2a2 − 1 5a2 − 2 −a 2a2 + 1 −3a2
−3a2 −a 2a2 + 1 5a2 − 2 3a 2a2 − 1
−a 2a2 + 1 −3a2 3a 2a2 − 1 5a2 − 2


- and for the outsiders (B or D):
HO = 1(1−a2)(1−4a2)

 5a2 − 2 3a

2a2 − 1
3a

2a2 − 1 5a2 − 2

 .
This leads the following SOCs conditions:
-for the insider platforms:
HA+C1  = − 2−5a24a4−5a2+1 < 0, HA+C2  = 4−9a24a4−5a2+1 > 0, HA+C3  =
− 8
4a4−5a2+1
< 0,
HA+C4  = 164a4−5a2+1 > 0;
- for the outsiders:
HB,D1  = − 2−5a24a4−5a2+1 < 0, HB,D2  = 4−9a24a4−5a2+1 > 0.
Thus the SOCs are satisﬁed for a < 0.5.
Equilibrium prices
As before, due to the symmetry between the insider platforms, as well as between the out-
siders, we obtain the following optimal post-merger prices: pA+C = c+ 20a∆−16∆−19a+14a2+68(3−4a) ,and
pB = pD = c + (a−1)4 (6a+4∆−3)3−4a . Note that: pA+C − c + ∆ ≥ 0,∀∆ ∈ [0, c] , but pB − c ≥ 0 iﬀ
∆ ≤ 32

1
2 − a
 ≡ ∆.
Price diﬀerences (post/pre-merger) for the insiders (A and C) and the outsiders (B andD) re-
spectively are now equal to g(∆, a) =
(4−5a)(12a∆−8∆−a+2a2)
8(3a−2)(4a−3) and l(∆, a) =
(1−a)(12a∆−8∆−a+2a2)
4(3a−2)(4a−3) .
Then ∆ = 14 (2a−1)a2−3a solves for g(∆, a) = l(∆, a) = 0, where ∆ ≤ 0 for any a < 0.5. Moreover,
∂
∂∆g(∆, a) =
4−5a
8a−6 and
∂
∂∆ l(∆, a) =
1−a
4a−3 , therefore both price diﬀerences are decreasing in ∆.
Thus g < 0 and l < 0 for any a < 0.5.
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Equilibrium proﬁts
The proﬁt diﬀerential for the merging and non-merging platforms equals respectively:
ΠA+C − 2Π∗ = − 116 16∆2(3a−2)3+a(2a−1)2(19a2−30a+12)−8∆(2a−1)(3a−2)2(7a−6)(3a−2)(2a−1)(4a−3)2
and ΠO −Π∗ = − 116 (a−1)(∆216(3a−2)2+∆24(2a−1)(3a−2)2+a(17a−12)(2a−1)2)(3a−2)(2a−1)(4a−3)2 .
We have that ΠA+C − 2Π∗ = 0 if ∆ = ∆1 or ∆ = ∆2, where
∆1 =
(2a−1)
2(3a−2)2

1
2 (7a− 6) (3a− 2)−
√
2 (4a− 3)(a− 1) (3a− 2)
and ∆2 =
(2a−1)
2(3a−2)2

1
2 (7a− 6) (3a− 2) +
√
2 (4a− 3)(a− 1) (3a− 2) .
It can be easily checked that ∆1 < 0 < ∆2 < ∆ for a < 0.5, leading to ΠA+C − 2Π∗ ≥ 0
whenever ∆ ∈ ∆2,∆ .
Similarly, it is straightforward to check that ΠO − Π∗ = 0 for ∆1 = −14a2a−13a−2 < 0 and for∆2 = −14 2a−13a−2 (17a− 12) > 0. Since ∆1 < ∆ < ∆2, we have that ΠO −Π∗ ≤ 0 for ∆ 0,∆ .
Consumers’ surplus
We can at ﬁrst compare the diﬀerence of consumer surplus between post and pre merger on
each side (note that since β = 1, the diﬀerence is the same for side 1 and side 2 )
z(∆, a) = CSA+Ci + 2CS
o
i −CS with i = 1, 2.
z(∆, a) = 164
(448a4−1162a3+36 a2∆+1113 a2−466 a−48 a∆+16∆+72)(2 a2+12 a∆−a−8∆)
(2 a−1)2(4 a−3)2(3 a−2)
We can note that with z(0, a) > 0. There exist two roots for z(∆, a) = 0, and both are
negative. As the diﬀerence for the overall consumer’s surplus is just given by 2z(∆, a), we
have the same roots. That means the merger between distant platforms always increases the
consumers’ surplus.
Welfare comparison
The diﬀerence between welfare in post and pre-merger cases is given by WA+C(∆, a) =
− 132 −16 a
5−1984 a4∆+20 a4+960 a3∆2+4944 a3∆−8 a3−4600 a2∆−2032 a2∆2+a2+1888 a∆+1408 a∆2−288∆−320∆2
(4 a−3)2(2 a−1)2
,
where
WA+C(0, a) > 0 if the cross-group externality is high enough, i.e. for a > 14 . Again, there
exist two roots for WA+C(∆, a) = 0, ∆WAC1 and ∆
WAC
2 , where ∆
WAC
2 < 0 and
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∆WAC1 =
1
4

124a3−247a2+164a−36+2
√
(2 a−1)(122 a3−239 a2+160 a−36)(4 a−3)2

(2 a−1)
(3 a−2)(20 a2−29 a+10)
, with ∆WAC1 ≶
0 if a ≷ 14 . So the merger between distant platforms is always welfare improving if a >
1
4 . When
a < 14 the merger is welfare improving if there exist high enough cost savings, ∆ > ∆
WAC
1 .
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